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ABSTKACT
The subject of the thesis are the major political f.'clc.s 
influencing the British European policy. The study tests the 
assumption that national systems are the main determinants of 
European policy.
^mong the domestic political factors the government and 
political parties are the dominant actors together with th? 
partly influential interest groups and highly volatile public 
opinion.
Moreover, the British European policy is constrained by tlie 
special relationships with the United States and to a h;sser 
degree by the Commonwealth relations.
To conclude, the British experience in Uie EC' is illust rate 1 
in two major areas of the Common Agricultural Policy and the 
European Political Cooperation.
Consequently, the conclusion confirms the assumption that th:? 
British EC policy is almost a reflection of its domestic politics 
and concerns.
ÖZET
Tezin amacı îngilterenin Avrupa Topluluğundaki politika' . ı ı 
oluşturmakta önemli rol oynayan iç politik etkenleri önemleri ve 
kısıtlayıcı yönleriyle ele almak, İngiltere’nin Avrui,a 
politikasının iç politikanın bir yansıması olduğu yolundaki 
varsayımı kanıtlanmaktır.
İncelenen etkenler içinde en önemli ve belirleyici olarok 
hükümetin ve siyasi partilerin politikaları bulunmuştur. Önemli 
çıkar grupları zaman ve konuya göre öne çıkmış, fakat kauıuo;.u 
tamamen diğer faktörlerin yönlendirmesine göre hareket etmiştir.
Politikayı kısıtlayan etkenler içinde ABD ile olan öz·/! 
ilişki hala önemini korumakta, oysa İngiliz Milletler Topluluğu 
simgesel olmanın dışında gittikçe azalan bir rol oynamaktadır.
Araştırmayı tamamlamak amacıyla İngiltere’nin Avrupa Topluluğu 
Ortak Tarım Politikası ve Avrupa Siyasal İşbirliği alanlarımlal;i 
politikası incelenmiştir.
Sonuç olarak İngiltere’nin Avrupa politikasının büyük ölçüde 
î rıgi 1 i z iç po 1 i ti kas ından kaynaklandığı görü İmci: t^d ı r.
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INTRODUCTION
Analytical Framework
Although new actors have introduced themselves into Lho 
international arena since the second world war, nation states 
are still the dominant and the most determinant actors in 
international relations. Likewise on the European scale, 
despite the development of the European Community as a 
regional, supranational integration movement, nation states 
within the European Community have retained their import>:;nc( 
as the most influential actors.
Each member state of the EC has a distinct hi sit .y, 
culture, economy, institutions and policy styles. Conseque-rJ 1;/, 
each member state has a distinctive position vis-a-vis EuropcMH 
integration. It is no exaggeration to say that each nation prints 
the mark of its national identity on its European policy.
As national systems still have such a significant role in 
European developments, overall examination of the EC is 
inadequate unless the peculiarities of each member state’s 
domestic structure is closely examined.
Based on this reasoning the main motivation in writing 
this thesis is to explain the domestic political factors> 
tdieir interactions and relative influence?s, in the formulatioi. 
of British European policy. Why does Britain have a different
stance vis-a-vis Europe ? I believe the answer to this: 
question lies to a great extent in the domestic politJcdi 
fa-ctors of the country.
A similar study has been made in the case of the Federal
1
Republic of Germany by Simon Bulmer and William Peterson. In
2
his article ’’Domestic Politics and EC Policy-making” Simon 
Bulmer outlines the elements of their analytical approach. 
Its bases are the following arguments:
1) The nation state is the basic unit in the EC and 
national governments formally hold key positions with respect 
to a whole range of policies. Therefore European policy is 
only one facet of their activity.
2) Each unit has different social and economic condilioiis 
that shape its national interests and policy content.
This leads to the basic assumption that the EC policy of 
the member states is conditioned by the same set of factors 
which shape the domestic policy. In this dissertation ray 
major objective will be to test this assumption for the case 
of Britain in order to evaluate its general validity.
Political Culture
In tlie analysis of domestic political factors, the concepL 
’’policy-style” will be employed. Policy style is define;: a.t 
the interaction between government's approach to probJiin-
solving and the relationship between the government i-nd c'!../
3
actors in the policy process.
The main emphasis is put on the British political culture 
in the sense that it shapes perceptions and actions of the 
domestic actors and is constrained by geographic location, 
limited resources and experiences of history. The policy 
style in formulating British European policy is also a 
product of this broader political culture.
In the British political culture the geographic 
situation plays an important role. The feeling of being an 
island for many centuries caused Britain’s isolation from t.he 
rest of Europe. Even today the English Channel still 
constitutes a psyhcological barrier against the different 
cultures, interests and thought processes in the rest of 
Europe. As a result, in its relations with the EC Britain had 
for a long time a feeling that it did not belong to Europe.
Related to its insularity Britain lias a history of 
a maritime empire lasting for centuries and projecting its 
force and culture all over the world. Although the empire has 
disintegrated, the economic and cultural ties with the ex­
colonies, organized in the Commonwealth of Nations, are still 
considerably strong.
After having enjoyed the status of a world power, it has 
been hard for Britain to adapt to its present status as a
medium power and even harder to think of any relations o:·
equal status with European states. Therefore Britain har^
always continued to look across the Atlantic to keep an
American-British special relationship rather than definitely
engage in relations with its continental neighbours. In
setting its priorities, as has been openly stated by 
. 4
Churchill, first place was given to relations with the 
United States, the second to relations with the Common­
wealth, while Europe remained in third place.
After these general remarks about the British political
culture, i.t is necessary to concentrate on some specifies
5
of this culture. By using the criteria developed by Sartori
in examining political culture, Britain has an empirical
approach to problem solving. ’’Instinct, trial and error, and
incremental change are the essence of the English approach
6
to problem solving”. This means that Britain is pragmatic, 
putting more emphasis on immediate economic and political 
solutions than on long-term ideals. In its European policy 
this explains why Britain emphasizes the economic aspects 
of EC more and is reluctant to join in the rhetoric 
about political union.
Britain is classified by Almond and Verba as having a 
strong allegiant orientation, i.e. the attitudes, feelings 
and evaluations of the public are favorable to the political 
system. This means that the basic values of the political
system are accepted and there is a high level of government 
stability and effectiveness. There is also a sense of pride 
in*the unwritten British constitution, British institutions 
and tlie British way of doing things in genera]. This reflects 
itself in British European policy in the sense that neither 
the political parties nor public opinion are eager to 
see any supranational authority in Brussels totally take 
over Westminister and Whitehall.
The British political culture emphasizes the virtues of 
compromise and conciliation and shows a dislike for conflict. 
Therefore J:he practice of British governments is to solicit 
the views of influential interest groups. Absence of 
opposition from the elite, interest groups and the general 
public, was a necessary precondition for a successful 
government policy in order to bring about EC membership. And 
tills membership did not come easily or quickly.
Brief History of British~EC Relations
Starting from the 1950’s and continuing into the 1960’s, 
there has been a transformation in British foreign policy. 
After its long history of overseas expansion and relative 
isolation from Europe, Britain had to shift its perspective 
fiom global to regional European interests. But this has been 
a gradual and slow process. Although Britain lacked the 
impetus for integration which was strongly felt in the
(i«:vastated European countries, in tfie longer term M.. 
deficiencies and decline of its economic and politicf?^ 
status could not be neglected. But the realization of trns 
leality has been slow.
During the 1955 nogotiations about forming the EEC there 
was still a belief among officials that Britain would be 
strong enough to stand apart from Europe. While Britain 
Joined the initial negotiations at Messina as a
spectator, actual participation was not being considered.
8
The main miscalculations of the British government were 
the assumption that the project would be unsuccessful, like 
the European Defence Community; and that the problem could be 
met by a wider free trade area. Furthermore, the likely 
obstacles to accession at a later date were underestimated.
The main reasons for British non-participation were
the ties with the Commonwealth,British interest in world-wide
free trade, the unacceptability of political federation, and
fdie perceived need for protecting British industry
9
against European compet i tion.
Efforts were exerted to divert the initiative towards the 
OEEC framework, aiming at keeping out of the far-reaching 
political impetus of the Six. The eventual conclusion was 
that Britain would not participate in the Common Market for 
political as much as economic reasons.
Several features of domestic politics affected thi^ : 
decision. The issue was regarded essentially as an issue 
foreign affairs. Therefore the ultimate responsibility co 
decide rested with the government. It was also regarded as 
being less significant than it actually was or as being too 
far-reaching to discuss it extensively. Consequently, the 
important decision as to whether to be a part of Europe or 
not, was not processed in the ordinary dialectic of domestic 
British politics in this initial stage.
At the July 1956 OEEC Council meeting Britain proposed 
the creation of a European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in order to 
link EEC with OEEC. The EFTA scheme foresaw free trade in 
industrial goods and excluding agriculture, especially 
because of British preferential trade with the Commonwealth. 
As the original Six went on with their idea, EFTA was formed 
in 1959 excluding EEC. But EFTA was unable to create 
solutions to the detoriating British economy and even in 
1960 speeches were made about the willingness of Britain to 
enter the EEC.
During the 1960*s the downturn in Britain’s economic 
performance created the realization that the continental 
neighbours were doing better in comparison to Britain. The 
government under Harold Macmillan applied for EEC membership 
in 1961. The decision had support among the British elite, 
but was not based on a broad consensus. It even faced 
opposition within both major parties and other important
8
groups.
But the economic argument for membership was strong enougfi 
to induce the government to put forward the application. 
[>ritain aimed at gaining advantage from a tariff-free raarkei 
of 180 million persons, with economies of scale and greater 
efficiency resulting from competition.
The first British application was vetoed in January 1963 
by De Gaulle, who was suspicious that Britain might act as 
a " Trojan horse” for the USA to dominate the EEC. The second 
application made by the Labour government of Harold Wilson in 
1967 was also turned down by the French veto.
Only after De Gaulle had to quit the French political 
leadership was the third application by Edward Heath in 1969 
successful. On January 1, 1973 Britain became a member of 
the EEC. But the membership remained controversial in 
Britain. In 1974, when Labour came to power again, they aimed 
at renegotiating the terms of entry and tabled a referendum 
on British membership.The country’s first national referendum 
was held in 1975, resulting in acceptance of British EEC 
membership by approximately 17 million ”yes”against 8 million 
"no”. Since then membership has not been questioned in 
principle although Britain has continued to follow a special 
line of European policy within the Community until the 
present day.
This brief history O’f British- EC relations together with 
the short overview of Britain’! political culture gives rise
to some questions about the factors v;hich deteriii:i 
course of events in Britain.
of the Thesis
Which factors influence British role in the EC? How far 
can gove-rnment policy be regarded as determinant? How far can 
interest groups and public opinion affect the government’s 
European policy, and through which channels? How do
differences between and within the parties affect this 
policy ? What are the constraints peculiar to Britain ? 
In ray attempt to answer these questions I will concentrate 
on the analysis of the following factors:
In the first place the government system is exiuained.
10
British political system has a ’’majoritarian" type of
government. Executive power is vested in the Cabinet,
which is always drawn from the majority in parliament, 
especially the House of Commons. Although the formal 
limitations to parliamentary power are weak, strong
informal customs restrain the majority government. Due 
to this executive dominance, parliament and the 
administration are not separately examined, but rather 
lonsidered under government policy.
Secondly, with respect to political parties, ihe division 
of opinion about the EC does not follo\. i'arty line:-;. Oil the 
o:>ntrary, intra-party divisions are of significant nature,
10
especially within the Labour party. Unqualified enthusiasm 
about tfie EC was shown only by the Liberals, who in alliance 
with the Social Democratic Party, gained a greater influence 
but lacked political power because the plurality system of 
elections in Britain favors major parties. Single party 
majority and government is the British norm.
Thirdly, in Britain organized interest groups check 
and balance not only each other but also the parties and the 
government, through being closely involved in decision­
making. Therefore the role of interest groups in British EC 
policy is examined. The Trade Union Congress (TUC), the 
National Farmers Union (NFU), the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) and the British Bankers Association (BBA) are 
■Ju' main organized gn>ups, maintaining liaison w i t ii 
ministers in Whitehall as well as with members of parliament, 
but concentrating mainly on the executive side.
Fourthly, British public opinion is examined. It is 
c»bvious that there is general consent on British membership 
in the EC but at the same time there is a lack of interest in 
^hat actually goes on within the EC decision-making process. 
In contrast to the public sensitivity to domestic politics 
there is rather less, or no, sensitivity to European 
parliamentary elections, as is marked by the low turn-outs. 
The EC supporters are mainly in the elite groups, but the 
consensus of public opinionevolves positively as EC does.
11
Finally, to conclude the peculiarities of the Br-itish 
political system, two main constraints are examined. 
first one is American-British relationships, which is mwoLiy 
a political, psychological concern for Britain and in this 
respect has been an important factor in its relationships 
with Europe. The second one is the relationship with the 
Commonwealth, which is mostly of pragmatic concern and has 
been influential mainly in the earlier periods of British EC 
policy, but has later lost its significance as economic
ties with Europe strengthened and practical solutions were 
found to some Commonwealth - related problems.
In order to illustrate the influence of these specific 
factors of British political system for British EC policy I 
will end my analysis with two case studies: the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the economic field and European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) in the political field. This 
aims mainly to answer the question whether there has emerged 
a European interest or whether national interests have been 
transfered unchanged into the community area.
12
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II. THE DOMESTIC STRUCTURE OF BRITISH POLICY-MAKING
1) Government
The Government's Approach Before EEC Membership
The structure of the British government and its domestic 
considerations have played a considerable role in
European policy since the Messina conference of 1955.
At the time, the question of Europe was not processed
in the ordinary dialectic of domestic British politics and
opinions on the question did not follow party lines.
Consequently the issue was regarded as being within the
1
ultimate responsibility of the government.
And inside the government the Treasury dominated the
issue. At the centre was the Mutual Aid Division, a
subdivision of the Treasury’s Overseas Finance Division.
Its correspondents were the Mutual Aid Department of the
Foreign Office and the Commercial Relations and Exports
Department of the Board of Trade.
This bureaucratic structure focused on the Mutual Aid
Committee, composed of departmental representatives, which in
2
return was tied to the Cabinet’s Economic Policy Committee.
During 1955 the Churchillian ordering of priorities 
still prevailed in official circles; thus first priority 
was given to the Commonwealth, second to relations with 
the USA and third to Europe. It was still thought that
14
Britain was strong enough to stand apart from attempts at 
European integration.
Nevertheless, Britain joined the Brussels negotiations 
with reservations. The actual aim of the Eden government 
was to influence the direction of the talks without totally 
committing Britain to the far-reaching political aims of the 
European Six. Britain was present in the negotiations to 
guide the initiative in a direction less harmful to
British interests. However, actual membership of Britain was
3
not considered at that time. On the contrary, Britain 
preferred the OEEC as a platform for cooperation with 
its European partners.
The Treasury under Butler did not show much interest
in the initiative and only favored a kind of association
with the Market on the grounds that Britain did not have
Diuch to gain from it. Butler was against a total refusal
4
because it would be 'misunderstood* politically.
In the Foreign Office the enthusiasm of Foreign Secretary 
Macmillan for European integration was not shared and 
ambiguity remained.
In order to deal with the issue, a Working Party on the 
European Common Market was formed under Burke Trend of tlie 
Overseas Finance Division and was composed of representatives 
from the related departments.
As the Economic Section of the Treasury together with Trend
15
emphasized the disadvantages of non-participation, the 
Treasury’s Overseas Finance Division together with the 
Commonwealth Relations Office argued that the difficulties 
that would result from participation were overwhelming.
The strength of the anti-European group was reinforced by 
uncertainties in the attitudes of European partners, mainly 
the French. Therefore a free trade area as opposed to a 
customs union was easily regarded as being far more 
acceptable.
Moreover, the Foreign Office under Macmillan adopted a 
stronger line, believing that without Britain, the common 
market initiative would collapse; but that if it did not,
Britain would suffer. Therefore, the common market should not
5
even be supported. This view was not shared by the Treasury, 
which argued that ’’Britain should say clearly that it could
not join a common market and should ask that the OEEC be kept
6
fjlly consulted.”
Taking due consideration of the Trend report, the Mutual 
Aid Committee agreed to recommend that Britain should not 
participate in the common market. This was reinforced by the 
Ministry of Defence’s decision not to join Euratom because of 
its supranationalty.
Clearing the governmental line Anthony Eden concluded that 
”tdie right policy was to lean towards supporting OEEC” while 
t^ rying ”to keep out of the Brussels powers”.?
16
Britain chose to stay away from these development mainly 
because of three reasons: First, Britain had a feeling ol 
traditional isolation also reinforced by the victory. 
Secondly, it was preoccupied with domestic reforms and post­
war reconstruction. Thirdly, the relations with the 
Commonweal til strengthened the illusion of a world power.
Thus in order to attain its limited objectives and avoide 
commitments to a European authority, Britain created the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 1959 together with Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland and Portugal.
However EFTA was of a little success in solving the 
problems of the declining British economy. In 1961 there was 
a serious balance-of-payments crisis and lower production 
growth in comparison to EEC countries.
Thus, during the 1961-73 period of British attempts at 
membership, successive Conservative and Labour governments 
held a similar position. EEC membership could produce a 
basis for a stronger Britain politically as well as 
economically and consequently produce a more equal Atlantic 
partnership with America. British economic and political 
vulnerabilities were realized.
Politically, Britain would inevitably be affected by the 
developments in Europe so, it has to play an active role.
Economically, the advantages of an expanded market and 
increasing EC trade was very important for the decision to 
Join EC.
17
Moreover, EEC membership could produce a more equal 
Atlantic partnership with America.
After the membership bid, negotiations were initiated in 
1971 and Britain became a member of EC in 1973. In order to 
solve the economic problems caused by entry, a five-year 
transitional period was applied and also concessions were 
given for some of the specific problems of the Commonwealth. 
Hence association agreements were negotiated between EEC and 
the Commonwealth.
Consequently, Britain became a member of the EC, gaining 
both political and economic advantages and most important of 
all it found a new role parallel to the changes in the world.
Adaptations After EEC Membership:
The first challenge to be met was the constitutional 
controversies. The main theme was concerned with the
conceptions of sovereignty and whether EEC membership
imposed limitations on national sovereignty.
When the European Communities Act of 1972 was introduced
its main feature was that it increased the scope of executive
policy-making with a corresponding loss of control over the
9
executive by Parliament. '’Thus, a modus vivendi seems to 
have evolved between the executive, legislature and judiciary
18
on the issue of the supremacy of EC law in the United
Kingdom. However, this does not mean that the constitutional
issue of Parliament’s sovereign law-making powers and the law
10
has been resolved - it has merely been avoided, so far." 
Today, it can be argued that British membership in the EC is 
an accepted fact within the administration and government.
As Britain entered an EC, which has developed a number of 
policies in certain areas, the British government was faced 
with the necessity to adjust.
The most affected areas were agriculture, iron & steel
industries and trade. Consequently, the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries (MAFF) and the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) supplied negotiators with the aim of improving their
11
understanding of the EC.
Within the governmental structure the main adjustment 
problem was the issue of central co-ordination. During the 
pre-entry period the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster was 
placed in the Foreign Office and given responsibility for 
negotiations, supervising a team composed of senior officials 
from key departments.
After EC membership the question remained whether to have 
a separate Minister for Europe or to rely it on the existing 
structures. However, the British system of ministerial
19
/•«.‘sponsibi 1 i ty for depaitments and collective d(?c is ion-raak i c.g 
in lh(* Cabinet, decreased tlie feasibility of a Minister foi· 
Fu'rope.
Consequently, the task of co-ordination and management of 
Britain’s EC policy was assigned jointly to the Cabinet 
Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The later’s 
importance in Whitehall increased significantly after EC 
membership. As Tony Benn of the Department of Energy 
concluded ’’The Foreign Office influence on Whitehall is now 
quite pernicious because the Foreign Office can properly 
claim that every bit of economic policy, industrial policy, 
social policy, is now European policy and has to be feci 
through tliem. ”
The FCO deals with the functions of receiving iriforinatior. 
from Brussels and distributing it throughout Whitehall. T( 
deal effectively with this huge task, the FCO has set up two 
European Integration Departments (EID), one dealing with 
external questions, the other with internal aspects of the 
EC, both staffed with EC experienced people.
Closely working with these departments the Cabinet Office 
takes responsibility for the co-ordination of policy. It 
is assisted by the European Secretariat which has a small 
staff recruited from EC related departments. The 
secretariat has the major task of faci 1 i tati?ig the resolution 
)f any differences between departments ovcm" policies and
20
t .'1C·! i c:s .
This mechanism for EC policy-makin^has continued to be 
more or less the same during successive Labour and
Conservative governments.
The absorption of EC work into existing departments of
the British government has certain advantages. ’*It presented
EC work as an extension of domestic policy-making, it
distributed responsibility throughout Whitehall, it made the
best use of short supply of expertise on EC affairs, and
finally it diffused EC work, making it less politically 
15
obvious.”
This departmental mechanism of EC policy-making has been 
very significant because it has transferred the domestic 
policy-making structures with their pecularities, limitations 
and constraints^ into EC policy-making.
Another area of British integration into Community
business was the task of regularly taking over the Presidency
of the Council of Ministers in the EC. The British Presidency
in the first six months of 1977 and in the last six months of
1981 has given Britain the opportunity to place its own
16
distinct imprint on the Council of Ministers and EPC. The
British Presidency got credit for its efficiency, mainly
seeing the task as management of a business. J t was mostly
17
pragmatic and ’’busiriesslike” rather than enthusiastic 
for constructive schemes. Consequently, the overall
21
impression left behind -except EPC - was rather negative.
However, by 1986, during the third British presidency, a
iHicinge in both British policy and the attitudes of other
^^ ¿irtners of Britain occurred. Thus Britain looked and felt
like an established member state, launching initiatives on
further integration and having more to](?rant public opinion 
18
within Britain.
Among British Civil Servants two kinds of loyalties
<Jeveloped after membersliip. Those working for EC institutions
continued to owe loyalty to Britain and at the same time to
the Community. While civil servants working in the home
departments where EC affairs were dealt with gradually
19
adopted an "outward looking" stance.
The main formal link between the Britisli Civil Service and 
the EC is the British Delegation to the European Community, 
t.he UKREP. Through their working relations with UKREP, the 
civil service becomes more familiar with the foreign service 
and EC affairs. And it is an important link for the
e\aluation of Commission proposals, which go through COREPER 
to the Council of Ministers.
The British EC Commissioners are oppointed by the Prime
Minister, usually from among the politicans of the two
leading parties. And British officials are nominated for
other high ranking posts in the Commission service, according
to the British unofficial quota of 20 % of Commission
20
posts. Despite their appointment the Commissioners have to
22
remain independent of their governments and they represent
the interests of the Community as a whole.
In relations with the European Parliament (EP), from
1973 to 1979 British MPs (Members of Parliament) from
Westminister were delegated to the EP, whicti provided another
forum for British influence. However, in a protest at British
membership the Labour Party refused to nominate delegates to 
2 1
EP until 1975. Thus, the role played by British MEPs 
(Members of Parliament) in this period was relatively weak 
and the attitude of the political parties towards MEPs was 
not very favorable.
In 1979 the issue of direct elections to the EP was
controversial for various reasons. First, the political
parties feared a potential loss of parliamentary sovereignty
as EC institutions developed a federal role. Secondly, the
development of transnational party groups within the
Parliament was very limited, therefore decreasing the role
of parties in the EP. Thirdly, there was a negative reaction
to the use of proportional representation (PR) in European
elections. After the elections, British MEPs were more
disengaged from the government as their status in
2 2
Westminister was regarded as "lowly’* and as they began to 
see their role much more related to EC institutions.
Tlie New Governmental Approach After 1979
The year 1979 marked a shift in the British government’s
23
European policy through the election to power of the 
Conservatives under a new leader, Margaret Thatcher.
In the election manifesto in 1979 the Conservative Icadv·]
made her position clear: ”Our country’s relative declin,
not inevitable. We in the Conservative party think we can 
23
reverse it.” Her main policies were aimed at strengthening 
Britain · both economically and politically and envisaging a 
world role, instead of a constructive role in European 
integration.
Prime Minister Thatcher lacked the enthusiasm of the 
former Conservative Heath government towards Europe and 
instead emphasized the negative features of EC membership. 
The influence of Thatcher was considerable due to the British 
system of government, which is open to the exercise of 
significant influence by the PM.
Furthermore, the general world recession and the pool 
British economic performance multiplied the negative effects 
of EC membership, especially the costs of adaptation to the 
Common Agricultural Policy and the increasing British 
budgetary deficits due to the high British contributions to 
the EC budget. At the time there was some popular tendency 
to blame only the EC for all nationaleconoraic problems. And, 
the British budgetary problem and the CAP complexities, which 
will be examined in detail in the fourth chapter, stood as 
overwlielraing problems over many years.
The Thatcher government gave greater priority to Mie
24
relationship with tlie United States and adopted a parallel
cold war stance towards the Soviet Union in East-v;(*si.
relations. At the same time, towards Europe the British Wi;tL
still obstructive on many issues. Thatcher continued to vi^-to
British participation in the European Monetary System (EMS)
until October 1990 and more often lined up with the USA in
world politics. Thus, for example, Britain gave full support
to the American policy towards the Soviet Union, Central
America and the Middle East and even gave permission to the
USA to use British bases for the American air attack on
25
Libya in 1986.
Up to now, the British government has continued to pursue
policies of a reluctant nature vis-a-vis Europt?a.i
integration. However, the southern enlargements of the EC
have increased the divergences of EC member government
positions, especially those of the Greek government. Still.
in the British government there has emerged a consensus that
"Britain was right to join the Community... A strong and
26
united Europe is better for all than a weak, divided one".
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2) Political Parties
The British political system has peculiarities of its 
owii which shape the parties and their outlook on European 
policy.
First, the British social structure has an unavoidable 
impact. The most significant issue dimension that divides 
society is the socio-economic one, which in turn gives rise 
to two major parties in the left-right political spectrum.
Therefore the major determinant in voting behaviour 
is the class or class consciousness of the voter. 
TraditionaHy, Conservative voters have been mainly from the 
middle class and Labour voters from the working class. But 
this division is not strict and has been changing steadily 
over the years resulting in a wider mix of voters from both 
classes in each party. In 1963 the percentage of middle class 
voting Conservative was 75%, but fell to 65% in 1974 as the 
proportion of working class voting Conservative increased. 
Moreover, both parties show similarity in the composition of 
the social background of their parliamentary parties-mainly 
from proffessional groups.
1
Apart from the socio-economic dimension, regional and 
religious ones exist but due to the British system they lack 
significant political weight with the exception of the MPs 
for Ulster.
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Secondly, the electoral system in Britain has an 
important impact on the party system· The British plurality 
5ivstem of elections determines the number of effective 
parties in politics. Through the practice of the first 
past - the - post system in single member constituencies the 
small parties are underrepresented whereas the major parties 
are disproportionately favoured. For smaller parties, the 
number of their MPs in the House of Commons fall very short 
of the number of their actual votes. On the contrary, the 
major parties, namely Conservative and Labour, are
over-represented in their seats in parliament.
Consequently, tlie Labour and Conservative parties play 
a dominant-role in British political life. Due to the lack 
cf coalition alternatives, general elections have been a 
contest between the major parties on ’’win or lose'’ terms. 
Therefore, majority governments, through their complete 
dominance in parliament, have become the rule in British 
politics. All these peculiarities of the British party 
system have a bearing on their European policy.
The Labour Party:
The Labour party in Britain acts mainly like the 
European Social Democratic parties in its policies of state 
intervent ion and welfare promotion.
However, it has one major difference from its 
counterparts. Organised trade unions played an equal role in 
the Labour party’s foundation together with the socialist
29
intellectuals and they still maintain direct organic links 
with it. In the party structure the trade unions form aboir. 
90% of the membership of the Annual Conference and control M  
places out of 28 seats in the National Executive Committee. 
However, in recent years their power position has diminished 
considerably.
In its European policy the British Labour party has 
been faced with problems. It has often been unable to 
maintain party unity on European policy and has lacked a 
consistent and clear line on this.
The overwhelming feeling in the British Labour party is
that it is more British than European socialist. The
Labourites believe in the superiority of Britain and envisage
a unique world role for it including preferential ties with
the Commonwealth and the USA. Therefore the party’s
identification with the nation state is a strong element in
the Labour approach to Europe. ’'The party has traditionally
identified itself with the maintenance of national
sovereignty, whilst an identification with a class interest
or a socialist interest across Europe has been very much less
3
apparent, even in party rhetoric and symbolism."
As national independence and sovereignty are among the 
basic values defended by Labour, the main causes for 
opposition towards European integration have been commitment 
to political independence and the dislike for 
supranat ionalty.
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However, the flexibility and pragmatism of the Labour 
party as has been a characteristic of British political 
culture has made it easy for the party to adapt to change 
and mod(>rate its programme in successive elections.
When the Conservative government of Macmillan applied 
for membersliip of the EEC in 1961 the Labour party did not 
commit itself to a firm position. Later, Labour was 
presented as the guardian of British interests and as being 
reluctant to enter new alliances. Consequently, in labour’s 
196‘1 election manifesto the Commonwealth was declared to be 
the government’s first responsibility.
The mood -softened in the 1986 elections, when Labour 
foresaw EEC membership provided British and Commonwealth 
interests were safeguarded. But as the debate on the common 
market deepened, intra-party divisions were increasing, 
when the leftwing of the party produced anti-marketers.
The Labour government under Wilson applied to the EEC 
in 1967 by securing a parliamentary majority and thereby 
gaining a political advantage over the Conservatives. It can 
be argued that the Labour moves were aimed at taking the lead 
in the EEC membership issue, but when they failed to do so, 
the\ opposed the Conservative government.
Mien tlie Conservative government under Heath stared to 
negotiate EEC entry the Labour left considerably increased 
its influence within the party. The largest Trade Unions 
shiflcHl from the right to the left wing of tlie party. And
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the Labour leadership felt the necessity to moderate its pro-
Luropeari views for fear of antagonizing the left. The split
between the party leadership and party majority became
obvious. In order to obtain party unity Wilson criticised
the terms negotiated by the Conservatives but at the same
time did not oppose entry in principle.
The. debate in the House of Commons in 1971 on EEC
membership heavily reflected intra-party divisions within the
4
Labour. The left considered the Market a "capitalist club",
being both foreign and elitist. The general belief, based on
the opinion polls at the time; was that most of the public
was against. EEC entry. Therefore as Labour coupled
its socialism with populism the main debate was whether the
House of Commons was acting as an "elitist minority" against
5
the "majority opinion of the people".
Although this was a general debate including all 
parties it was of particular concern for Labour because of 
its commitment to mass democracy. And believing that it 
represented the public opinion. Labor advocated the need for 
a national referendum, which was alien to British political 
practice.
As the party split, the pro-Market leadership of 
Labour gradually developed into a minority role, in effect 
actually supporting the Conservative government. The pro- 
Marketeers put forward the view that it was their duty to act 
according to their judgement as the political leadership and
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In the parliamentary vote on British entry into the EC
tlie· Labour dissidents voted 69 voting in favor of membership
7
while 198 Labourites were against , thus enabling the Heath 
government to achieve an overwhelming majority in favor of 
entry.
But British entry to the EEC did not end the
controversy over membership. And in 1974 when Labour
returned to government re-negotiating the terms.of entry and
holding a referendum were primary objectives. However,
during the 1975 referendum campaign the position of the
Labour government was different from that of the party. In
contrast to VTilson’s advice to accept the new terms, the NEC
(National Executive Committee) of the party and the Labour
8
Special Conference favored a British withdrawal.
In the voting in the Commons, Labour was split with a
vote of 145 against, and 137 for membership. However, the
actual result of the referendum reflected a favorable
9
consensus, 2 to 1 in favor of EC membership.
Still the party continued its commitment to
sovereignty, rejecting any increase in the powers of EC 
institutions. Thus the issue of direct elections to the
European Parliament again aroused strong feelings for or
against the EC. First, direct elections would strengthen 
the political legitimacy of the EP and second, the use of
Ij-iat minority opinion might prove correct.
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proportional representation there could challange the Britis .
electoral system. In the parliamentary voting the number o;
Labour MPs opposing proportional representation was 115
10
while 147 voted in favor.
The first direct elections to the EP were held in 1979,
just after the national election defeat of the Labour party,
which reinforced anti-EC feelings. Labour got 33% of the
11
votes and 18% of the British seats. Labour’s opposition to
direct elections to the EP created the image of ’’reluctant
12
partners” in the eyes of the other Community members.
It would be correct to claim that due to the British 
electoral system, once Labour go into opposition after a
general election, as in 1979, they adopt a position of 
opposing the Conservative government’s EC policy. Thus 
Labour took an aggressive posture on EC issues and even in 
1980 adopted withdrawal of Britain from the EC as the right 
policy to be applied by the next Labour government. Due to 
this totally unpopular step, the divisions within the party 
reached their peak and in 1981 pro-Market right-wingers left 
it, forming the Social Democratic Party.
Now that the Labour majority was overwhelmingly on the 
left the 1983 election manifesto forsaw withdrawal from 
the EC immediately Labour came to power. These Labour zig­
zags created doubts in the minds of voters and reinforced the 
Tliatcher government’s victorious re-election.
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After this major defeat in the general election, and
the election of Neil Kinnock as party leader, Labour opli?d
13
for a ’’new realism" in policy- making. This also effected 
Labour’s approach in the 1984 EP elections. The election
manifesto emphasized reforming the EC from within, but 
nevertheless retained the option of withdrawal. The new 
realism brought British Labour closer to its continental 
counterparts as it was able to sign a common manifesto of 
the Confederation of EC Socialist Parties in the 1984 
elections.
At the same time, together with the strengthening of the 
’’soft left·” within the party, more emphasis was given to 
the material costs and benefits of EC membership to the 
domestic economy, thus coming more into line with European
Socialists.
Today, despite ambiguities in Labour policy towards 
the EC, the party is in gradual transition towards a pro- 
European position.
The Conservative Party:
The British Conservative party is traditionally closely 
identified with the established groups and interests in 
middle-class sociey, mainly land, business and church and 
il is committed to a laisse2 - faire approach in economic 
IK)licy; it thus shares common characteristics with its 
Euiopean counterparts.
35
Unlike Labour, the Conservatives aim at serving all
interc*sts as a national party and this national outlook has
made it necessary for the party to widen its
organization. Although its voters are traditionally mainly
from the middle class, a considerable portion, nearly two-
14
fifths, of the working class now vote Conservative.
In· addition to its wider national appeal, the 
structure of the Conservative party is different from that of 
Labour. In the Conservative party the National Union, the 
Executive Committee and the Annual Conference have advisory 
roles, while the Leader of the party has full control over 
the central organization and has the actual decision-making 
power. The Leader’s unchallengeable influence over policy is 
also coupled with his total responsibility for the party.
This centralisation of policy - making in the 
Conservative party reinforces its effectiveness and its
unity vis-à-vis European policy. However, this
centralisation decreases the stability of the Leadership 
position through a harsher contest for leadership within the 
l)arty.
On European policy the Conservative party has at times 
been less enthusiastic than its leadership. In the 1960*s 
and 1970’s the actual enthusiasm for British membership of 
the EEC derived mainly from Edward Heath, who took Britain 
into it. Nevertheless, a pro-European majority and party 
unity has been more easily sustained within the Conservative
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]iart.y than within Labour.
While sharing the feelings of British superiority and
iiat ional interests in the Commonwealth and in relations with
ihe L.S.A , the Conservatives saw a good opportunity in
European integration to compensate for the decline of British
economic and political power. Furthermore, "The Conservative
Party saw great electoral advantages in appearing as the main
pro-Europe party and being seen to contrast with a rather
15
insular-looking Labour party beset by internal wrangles**.
Party discipline and voting homogeneity have been
.stronger among the Conservatives. In the parliamentary vote
in 1971 on British entry to the EC only 39 Conservative MPs
dissented from the general view while 282 voted in favor of 
16
IX' membership.
After entry the Conservative party became closely 
17
identified with the EEC. Especially under the leadership 
of Heath, wlio had a pro-Europe stance and relative 
coolness towards American relationships, British relations 
with Europe developed smoothly.
However, the election of Margaret Thatcher as party 
leader marked a shift away from the pro-EC stance. Resistence 
emerged to supranationality in any development in the EC 
towards further integration. Thus in the 1979 direct 
elections to the EP the Conservatives showed less enthusiasm
37
\)>'Л vscrc keen to appear as a pro-Euroi)ean i>arty. There was
strong' opposition to proportional representation in the
rions, when 198 r'oiiservat i ve MPs voted against and only 
18
G1 Ml's were in favor.
During the election campaign the Conservatives claimed
Lliat '’direct elections were no threat to the Conservative
f;arty l)(‘cause, as has been shown already * Europe was a
19
i'Uisorvat i ve issue’". And in the elections to the FP the
Ccuiser\atives got 50% of the votes and gained 59 out of
20
81 seats.
The riew Conservative government under Thatcher
cciminitted itself to the strengthening of Britain both
economically and politically. Consequently more emphasis
was given to a world role for Britain in an Atlantic
perspective rather than on the European scale.
On the ecorjomic side, stress was put upon British 
21
"\ital interests”. Thus the record of British membership 
of the EC has been one of constantly seeking adjustments to 
the problem of British budgetory contribution and reform of 
Ihe CAP.
However, after a close examination of the problems, 
.t is evident that British minimalism in Europe stems from 
pragmatic concerns rather than deep-seated anti-European
fee 1 iiigs.
In the Conservative party it can easily be argued
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!}iat, t.he i^radual qualification of its pro-Europeani sm has the 
imprint of Tha tchc'r i sm. As the Conservative leader, who has 
hec'ii three:^  limes re-elected, she has been an influential and 
slioiii; leader, thus the Conservat i ve European policy has 
l;(‘Come a Tliatcherite one.
The Liberal Party
The British Liberals are committed to economic laissez-
faire policies and free trade. They pursue ”middle-of-the-
22
road” policies, balancing the programmes of their major
rivals.
Due to the disproportional electoral system in Britain,
the Liberals are urider-represented in parliament. In the
1971 elections, although they got approx i mate* 1 y 19% of the
votes, they could only get 2% of the seats.
The Liberals are the pre-eminent pro-EC party in
Fr ‘tain, but. tliey lack significant political influence.
Th(* major weakness of the party is the transient riatura* of
its support, since it lacks identification wiUi certain
class or interest group. However, the Liberals have acted
as a "catalyst in the formation of major political ideas”,
23
as was the case in British entry to the EC.
On the issue of direct elections to the EP tin*
Liberals gave unqualified support and, through the Labour- 
liberal pact in 1977, wor».^  able to impose the early
39
intioduction of legislation. But in the elections in 1979
tin* Liberals won no seats, despite their 13% share of the 
21
\  o L ( i S .
The Liberal influence reached its peak with the
Liberal - SDP Alliance, which contained the roost consistent
pro-European elements in Birtish political life.
Nevertheless, their influence remained limited. Although in
the 1983 general elections the Alliance won 25.5% of the
popular votes, their share of seats in the House of Commons 
25
was only 3.5%.
Liberal support and the Alliance declined after 1983 
and actually became insignificant vis-à-vis European policy, 
since the British political system gives no alternative role 
to coalition governments.
The" Social Democratic Party:
The British Social Democratic party is an off-spring of
the Labour party, when pro-European Labourites broke away
from the party in 1981. The Social Democrats favored
decentralisation, electoral reform and British membership of 
26
the EC.
Apart from the 1983 elections when it won one-fourth 
of the popular votes in alliance with the Liberals, the
Social Democratic party lost its initial momentum and
gradually declined in support. Finally in 1990 it ended 
its own political existence.
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The Other Parties:
Other British Parties are mainly founded on regional 
bases. The Scottish Nationalists (SNP) and the Welsh 
Nationalists (Plaid Cymru) act as pressure groups aiming, 
for self-government but lacking actual political weight. And 
in Northern Ireland the Ulster Unionists represent the 
Conservative party. Besides these there is the National 
Front, which is a racist, extreme right party, remaining 
also marginal.
All these minor parties lack strength and parliamentary 
power to influence British European policy, but they may 
act as pressure groups.
Consequently, Britain will continue to be dominated by 
the two relatively heterogeneous and fairly opportunistic 
political parties, the Labour and the Conservative. And 
therefore British European policy will continue to be 
affected by the approaches of these parties and their contest 
for governmental power.
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3) Interest Groups
The major interest groups in Britain havebeen actively 
involved in European Community issues, especially since 
British membership in 1973. Although their composition, 
relative influence, priorities and channels of influence 
differ from each other, they play a considerable role in 
promoting'British interests in the Community.
To identify ’^pressure groups” four essential
1
characteristics are outlined : membership should be open to
those sharing a particular interest, there should be a 
structured organisation designed to promote and defend this 
common interest, there should be access to decision-making 
bodies, and continuous effort to promote this interest.
In line witli this approach, among British interest 
groups four are included in this analysis by reason of 
tlieir significant influence both domestically and in European 
policy.
The Trade Union Congress (TUC), the British Bankers 
Association (BBA), the Confederation of British Industry 
((7BF) and the National Farmers Union (NFU) are all affiliates 
of European level organizations and exert influence in order 
to promote their interests in the European Community.
The Trades Union Congress (TUC):
The British Trade Union Congress is a vital interest
44
group which has influence over domestic economic decision­
making. The TUC repr»?sents over 100 industrial and ci*aft
2
unions, bringing together 10 million organized workers.
The TUC was initially reluctant and even negative in
its European policy mainly due to the belief that it would
not gain anything from Europe. Thus, the TUC supported the
Labour party’s opposition to British EEC membership. The
underlying reason for the TUC’s anti-EC campaign was that
membership would undermine its own influence which has been
3
very great within Britain.
But t^ wo major domestic constraints have affected the 
TUC’s outlook on Europe since then. First, the combination 
of rising inflation and unemployment during the British 
economic recession has undermined the strength of the TUC 
vis-à-vis the Britisli government. The realization of the 
limitations of domestic solutions and the increasing 
interdependence of economies has arrused TUC interest in 
European Communities.
Secondly, the close relationship between the TUC and 
the Labour party has been of significant concern. The Trade 
Unions have a leading role in the party structure, thus 
m<4king it essential for the TUC to support Labour governments 
without many reservations.
Consequently the TUC moved towards European policy
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after the referendum of 1975 in order to increase iii:
influence on the British government and its economic policies
by exercising influence on other European national 
4
governments. The main focus of the TUC^s initiative in
Europe has been national macro-economic policy goals, 
especially the reduction of unemployment, rather than
Community goals.
The TUC is affiliated to the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC). Although this has been the best forum 
for the TUC to have access to other European Unions and gain 
their support on important issues, ETUC’s influence has been 
limited due to differences of experience, priorities, 
national environments and org;anizational strengths among its 
members. An example of factors hindering consensus is that 
the sensitivity of the British TUC on unemployment is not 
shared by the Germans whose overriding fear is inflation.
Inside the ETUC the British TUC is the largest and
most powerful body and thus exercises disproportionate
influence. Thus, during the ETUC initiative on unemployment
in 1975 the TUC began to assert its leadership over the
5
direction of the initiative.
The Economic and Social Committee (ESC) of the EC is 
the formal forum for direct access by the TUC to the European 
Communities; however, it has remained a consultative body 
and, thus, has been less effective for the TUC’s purposes.
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The very weak role of the ESC in EC decision-making and its 
composition and quality of representation, have been
unsatisfactory for the TUC. As a result, the TUC gives 
priority to other more influential channels.
Among other channels is the Standing Committee on 
Employment of the EC, which provides the TUC with a forum for 
consultations between trade unions, employers and the 
Council of Ministers for social affairs, about the 
Commission’s proposals. Moreover, a Tripartite Economic and 
Social Conference and other advisory committees, where the 
TUC has direct representation, exists in the EC.
Furthermore, the contacts of the TUC with
Commissioners or EC civil servants directly or through the 
ETUC are helpful for obtaining advance information.
The main strategy of the TUC has been to push in all
directions to influence European decision-making, as it has
6
been doing domestically. During the 1975 unemployment
initiative the TUC pressed the ETUC, together with efforts
in the ESC, and attempted to influence the Council of
Ministers through the British government.
Nontheless, the TUC believes that national
7
government decisions remain the most important ones. In 
considering European policy as an alternative to its domestic 
decline, its aim has been to influence the decisions of 
national governments and the Community which in turn affect
47
the decisions of the British governoient and hence the
interests of TUC members.
The success of TUC initiatives in the European
Communities depends on the willingness and ability of the
8
British government to carry them forward. As the main 
concerns for the TUC remain working conditions, the European 
initiative provides it with the opportunity of a platform 
where the British government is likely to support the TUC 
goals because of shared concern for British problems.
Consequently, domestic concerns and political
relationships inevitably shape the European policy of the 
TUC.
The British Bankers Association (BBA)
The BBA was founded in 1972 to represent the views of 
British Bankers to the European Communities. It is
affiliated to the European Banking Federation (BFEC), which 
accepts only one association for each member country.
The BBA uses three channels to influence EC policy;
first through its membership in BFEC, second through direct
Community contacts, and third through UK government
9
contacts.
The BBA places strong emphasis on its representation, 
particularly to the Commission, through the BFE. Hence the 
BBA perceives the BFEC as an influential body in which the
48
has a pr i V i [ju:-: i t ioii due to the st.alus of London as
an : li t ‘‘rria t i orial f i n an c e  centre  and to i t s  r o le  as  the
10
]j ! ' inci j;ai  si 'okcsmari f o r  91% o f  i t s  f.*lig' i l)lc nM-mfx·rs.
\llhoin;}i the DBA d i r e c t s  its Community activities from 
!> I oncicai o f f i c e ,  it maintains informal contacts with 
( onir.i i ss  ion (officials through visits to Brussels. 1 rr addition 
it maintains contact with the European Parliament and its 
(M)mmitt(H^ s mainly by concentrating on ap[uo\i mate ly 15
British MEPs who pass on EP views. The BRA also has direct 
c o n t a c t  with tlie Economic and Social Committee, wher<^  it is 
re j i re se nte d  on a nation/il basis.
During the discussions on the EC Banking Directive,
the BBA proved very effective and influential. It
1 ressed the British government directly or through EC
scrutiny committees of  both Houses of Parliament together
with its representations to MEPs and contacts with Commission
11
o f f i c i a I s .
The BFEC was the most important channel of access to the
Commission, where the BBA directed most of its attention.
Relations with the Council of Ministers were maintained
through UK Channels, in particular via the Bank of England,
12
the Treasury and the Department for Trade and Industry.
Consequently, the BBA became an elective and leading 
lobby of the EC banking Community. As a result, the final EC
49
Banking Directive adopted in 1977 was pragmatic, in line* 
with the BBA’s proposal of maximum flexibility and self 
regulation.
This directive is illustrative of BBA*s approach as an 
interest group. The Association aimed at promoting its 
interests through as many channels as were open to its 
influence. The BFEC has been an effective one, where the 
BBA has opted for leadership. And most of all, British 
government channels have been extensively used as a result of 
the influential status of the Association, especially through 
the Bank of England, other domestic channells, and through 
its established ties with the government.
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI)
The CBI is the peak organization in the industrial
sector, having as members over 15,000 individual companies,
all the major nationalized industries and 200 trade 
13
associations. The CBI*s strength lies in its close,
formal and informal contacts with the government in contrast
to its own weakness stemming from the divisions within
itself and its inability to ensure the compliance of its 
14
members.
After its establishment in 1965 the CBI declared its
general support for British membership of the EEC and began
15
to treat European affairs as an integral part of its work.
The CBI is a member of the Union of Industries of the
50
European Communities (UNICE), which has been qualified as a 
16
’’social partner” along with trade unions and thus enjoys 
enhanced access to the Commission. The CBI relies on UNICE 
to represent its views to EC authorities.
Moreover, the CBI makes use of its extensive range of
direct contacts with the Community autliorities, especially
through its Brussels office, which functions as a liaison
17
with UNICE and as a ’’listening post" for the CBI in London.
Usually the CBI prefers to work through Whitehall, 
UNICE and the Economic and Social Committee. In comparison 
to the BBA, the CBI has an even more extensive range of
national-level contacts and more resources to utilize as a 
result of its wide scope of interests. It uses British 
channels extensively at the appropriate stage of decision­
making. It submits evidence on EC matters to the committees 
of the two Houses of Parliament. And it has frequent direct 
access to a wider range of members of the Council of 
Ministers together with officials of UKREP.
Besides this, the CBI maintains contact with all
Britisli MEPs to express its views to the EP and out of 8
British nominees of employers to the ESC 6 are nominated by 
18
the CBI. The CBI enjoys such privileged status due to its 
role as a social partner.
Like the BBA, the CBI aims at utilizing all accessible
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channels whenever necessary. Its approach can best be
described in the w’ords of a CBI official! · · .usin^ as many
channels as we feel are open to us in getting our views 
19
across”. Consef4uently, the CBI adopts a case-by-case 
approach, exerting influence on channels it finds 
appropriate for the issue at hand.
The National Farmers Union (NFU)
The NFU has been the interest group most directly 
affected by the British membership of the EC., It has been 
particularly effective within Europe and enjoys a good 
working relationship with the Ministry of Agriculture.
Moreover, to ensure the promotion of its interests the 
NFU has an office in Brussels and has contacts with the 
agricultural staff of the British Delegation in Brussels as 
well as with British MEPs who are interested in agriculture.
Within Europe the NFU works through the COPA (Comité des
Organisations Professionelles Agricoles des Communautés
Européènes). Furthermore, the NFU took the initiative in
establishing the European Liaison Group for Agriculture
20
(ELGA), incorporating 25 organizations.
The National Farmers Union of Scotland is also 
significant because it represents almost one-third of 
agricultural sector in Britain. NFU Scotland works in 
cooperation with the NFU and aims at influencing the British
52
government and EC through contacts in both London and 
21
Edinburgh.
The NFU is the most effective British lobbying system 
in Brussels and is involved in a price review process both 
there and in London. It has informal contacts with Commission 
officials and committees, but prefers to work through COPA 
and the British government.
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1 ) EhIiU lQ Opinion
In examining British public opinion on the European 
C(;mnfunity the most appropriate tool is the polls conducted at 
freciuerit intervals. However, it should be noted that 
c)])inion polls may be misleading at times due to their 
inherent limitations. When, for instance, the wording of a 
question is altered, sharply different responses may be 
obtained which could totally change the resulting picture. 
Therefore the margin of error in polls should be borne in 
mind.
General Remarks:
An obstacle in the British case is the volatility of
public opinion in Britain on the EC, which is characterized
by frequent fluctuations and uncertainties. Quick and
radical shifts have become the rule. As an example, only 22%
of the population favored British EC membership, while 64%
opposed it in the March 1970 polls, but in the referendum of
1975 on membership 67% of the population voted in favor
1
and only 33% against. Thus in five years nearly 30% 
of the population had changed sides radically.
This volatility of public opinion may be attributed to
the complexity of Europan issues, which hinders the layman
from understanding these and developing a consistent view on 
2
them.
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Conse(4uently, the public at large is open to influence
by the positions of the political parties and has a
tendency to regard and evaluate EC issues, like domestic
ones, on the basis of its general feelings about the
3
government, Conservative or Labour, at Westminister.
4
Thus, ’’party identification” o f ‘people correlates
closely with their opinions on the EC. As EC issues are
integrated into domestic party politics, the fluctuations
in public opinion are a natural reflection of changes in
party policies. Hence in 1967 when the Labour party
advocated EC membership. Conservative and Liberal supporters
of the EC increasingly opposed to the idea until in 1973 the
Conservative government took the initiative on EC membership.
In parallel with this, in 1973 Labour supporters of the
EC saw no difficulty in turning to opposition to it.
Moreover, class, region and age groups are also
relevant factors in British public opinion. Generally, EC
membership finds more support among men than women, among
tlie young than the old, among the middle class than the
working class and among the inhabitants of the South East
5
than those in the rest of the country. According to an
evaluation based on age-groups in Britain in 1967, the
highest percentage of support for the EC is found in the
youth sample between the ages of 16 to 19, at 63%. In
contrast the age group between 55 and over gives an average 
6
support of 49% . Thus British youth appears to be more
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"European” than British adults. Among the classes in British
society, middle and upper classes, i.e. manufacturers,
exporters, bankers, professional are thought to be
beneficiaries of EC membership whereas lower classes, i.e.
7
workers, farmers, etc. are thought to be sufferers. And 
among the regions the North remained the most anti-EC one, 
while South-East was pro-EC.
In conformity with the assumption that when the public 
views other nation states favorably, it will also have 
positive views on integrating with these states, the British 
public sets its preferences. There is a lack of strong 
feeling of positive affection for the member states of the 
European Community. But, at the same time there are 
stronger feelings of affection for the USA and the 
Commonwealth. This is mainly due to British history of an 
Empire and the inability of British people to identify 
themselves with Europe; but, gradually this attitude is 
turning more positive in favour of Europe.
Main Concerns:
The responses to opinion polls reflect the British 
people’s concern for national interests, both economic and 
poli tical.
The dislike for supranationality is a major concern, as 
the British are unable to accept the transfer of sovereign 
powers from Whitehall to Brussels. Therefore, the British 
have remained relatively cool and reluctant towards the idea
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of European integration and the development of supranational
institutions. In the 1972 opinion polls it became evident
that the idea of a European government which would be
totally responsible on foreign affairs, defence and the
economy, was unacceptable to the British people. Out of
the total only 29% were in favor of a European government,
while 47% rejected the idea. Among labour supporters the
9
negative view increased to 52% .
However, the expectations from EC membership were not
totally negative. On the contrary, the political benefits of
close cooperation with European states were significant for
public opinion. Many people, according to a poll, think
that Britain’s membership of the EC will benefit her in terms
of defence, her position in the world and her voice in
10
international affairs.
However, it can be argued that the main aim of the
population and its expectations in the European Community
is not to strengthen European integration but to strengthen
11
the nation state, that is Britain.
The economic expectations of the British people play a
significant part in the formation of public opinion towards
the EC. For instance, the hostility of public opinion vis-
à-vis the Community after 1969 was mainly due to the
12
expectation of higher prices, particularly of food. In the 
1971 polls 71% believed that food prices would increase
59
markedly and 41% also believed other prices would increase.
In 1972 a slightly more optimistic view emerged on the
effects of entry on prices, wages and employment, but still
not positive. These negative economic expectations were
influential because of pragmatic concern for the effect on
the day- to- day lives of the people. Consequently, in 1972
32% of the population favored British entry whereas 41% were 
14
against.
Conclusion
The volatility of public opinion on EC membership in
Britain shows that views on the Community are not well
established and that the public is vulnerable to changes of
mood in the country and in domestic party politics. As a
result, the average level of support fluctuates according to
short-term influences and varies from group to group, with
CijMservatives, white collar workers and those below the age
15
of 45 being more positive than the others because the EC
offers more tangible benefits to these social groups.
However, ‘’The Community is still far from being a salient
political issue with an everyday relevance for the British
people. The British seem likely to continue to take whatever
lead is clearly given to them by their national political
16
elite events and media.”
i:.
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Ill SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS IN FOREIGN POLICY
After the Second World War, British Foreign Policy was
basred on three interlinked circles, as has been said by
Churchill: ’’The first circle for us is naturally the British
Commonwealth and Empire, with all that that comprises. Then
there is also the English-speaking world in which we,
Canada, and the other British Dominions and the United
States play so important a part. And finally there is United
1
Europe".
The two circles which had traditionally priority
over Europe, mainly the Commonwealth and United States,
have different features and are in gradual transition and
change. Especially in the 1960*s the adequacy of the links
2
of the past to British needs has been questioned.
1) British-American Relations
Britain after the Second World War was an active and 
keen participant in the Atlantic Community, together with 
its special relationship with the United States.
For decades thereafter Britain appreciated the role of 
the United States in the economic recovery of devastated 
European States and the American defence posture in Europe.
Although the relationship has not been easy-going at 
all times, the British policy has always aimed at keeping
62
its close ties with the United States at all costs. ”No
other country in Western Europe is nearly so well qualified
to ensure that the connection between the United States and
3
West European policies remains secure”.
Especially until the Suez crisis of 1956, British
committment to the ‘special relationship’ was an overwhelming
concern. Illustrative of the British preference for the United
States over Europe is Winston Churchill’s statement to
Charles de Gaulle: ”...each time we must choose between
Europe and the open sea, we shall always choose the open
sea. Each time I must choose between you and Roosevelt, I
4
shall always choose Roosevelt.”
On the American side the US government was committed 
to European Union and saw it as the best way to liberalize 
t.lie international trading system in a way was advantageous 
for the United States. At the same time, the British 
government believed that the British world role would be best 
assured through a special relationship with the United 
States.
So, Britain was in an ambiguous position. It preached
loyalty to NATO and US leadership, but at the same time it
refused to accept the US view that Britain should work
5
actively for European Union.
The British government still in the 1950’s valued the 
British Empire, and therefore actual membership in the EEC 
was not considered. As Churchill openly stated: ”...with
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our position at the centre of the British Empire we could not
6
accept full membership of a federal system of Europe*’.
Consequently the British position towards Europe was
7
based on two important assumptions. First, that the 
Americans would upgrade the British Empire-centered world 
role, and secondly that Britain would be able to maintain 
its relative economic and industrial superiority vis-à-vis 
European states.
However, the Suez crisis of 1956 showed Britain that
reliance on American relations could prove wrong. In that
crisis, the US government refused to back the Anglo-French
invasion of Egypt, and in fact sabotaged the military
operation. This historic event helped the British government
to realize that Britain could neither afford to stay outside
the EEC nor completely trust its ’special relationship* with 
8
America.
Furthermore, although Britain was completely dependent 
on US defence policy and the NATO alliance, there was little 
evidence of any specific British influence over US foreign or 
defence policy. Still, the British government gave priority 
to consultations with Washington on all major economic, 
military and political developments before consultation with 
its European allies.
The continous decline of the British economy was 
reinforced by the enormous costs of maintaining British 
world-wide committments, by the reserve and trading currency
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role of sterling, and by the burden of Britain’s independent 
nuclear force.
But when Britain first decided to become a part of 
Fiirope it was stopped by de Gaulle’s veto, based on his 
reasoning that Britain could not be a ’loyal European’ but
would instead act as a ’Trojan Horse’ for American interests
9
within Europe.
However, by 1967 US enthusiasm for European 
integration started to vanish, due to the economic frictions 
resulting from the Common External Tariff as a barrier to 
American products and also due to the political conflicts 
between the United States and Gaullist France.
So at the time Britain joined the EEC in 1973 the
Community was moving away from the United States. And 
Britain had missed the opportunity to influence the evolution 
of the Community institutions and to benefit from EEC 
economic prosperity. Thus the combination of economic decline 
with an inability to choose between an Atlantic and a 
European role prevented Britain from being a constructive
mfimber of the EC. Consequently the British government took
10
a ’minimalist’ stance on key issues and still continued
uiiwilling to confront the United States on EPC matters, such 
as in the Middle East initiative of 1979.
The Thatcher government revived the commitment to the 
At lantic Allience and the USA from 1979 onwards. ’’We 
believe in the Conservative party that our foreign policy
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should continue to be based on a close understanding with our
11
traditional ally America”.
The British victory in the Falklands war in 1982
depended considerably on the active assistance of the United
States and therefore demonstrated the continuing importance
12
of the Anglo-American relationship. Correspondingly, the
British actively supported the hostile American policy 
towards the Soviet Union. However, strains in the
relationship occurred as a result of unilateral American 
actions, especially SDI and the Reykjavik summit of 1986.
To conclude; the special relationship with the United 
States is- an on-going theme in British politics and 
consequently on British European policy. Although it has
declined or increased in relative importance at certain 
times, it is always there in the minds of British 
politicians as a significant concern in policy-making.
2) The Commonwealth
The disintegration of the British Empire gave way to
the existance of the Commonwealth of Nations, where Britain
was the leader of a world-wide association with major
commitments. The Commonwealth gave Britain at least the
13
illusion of ’’Great-Power Status”, although the country was 
in decline both in economic and political terms.
Thus EEC membership would be in conflict with 
Britain’s Commonwealth commitments and its assesment of world
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power status. And until 1961 Britain argued that she could
not join the EEC, because of these commitments, which
included preferential tariff arrangements for Commonwealth
trade. Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan
stressed that '’...We could not expect the countries of the
Commonwealth to continue to give preferential treatment to
our exports to them if we had to charge them full duty on
14
their exports to us”.
Consequently, in 1957 Britain proposed a Free Trade
Area, including the EEC Six and other European countries,
which would be limited to industrial goods. Here the
Diajor aim of the British government was to safeguard
Commonwealth interests by retaining the freedom to sustain
lower tariffs to Commonwealth countries through excluding
agricultural products from the free trade area framework.
However, the collapse of the negotiations reflected the
British inability to reconcile her European and non-European 
15
i nterests.
In 1960 EFTA was established outside EEC, and this
provided Britain with an alternative to "avoid a decision
16
between Commonwealth and Europe” , because EFTA permitted 
each member to retain its tariff levels towards third 
countries, in contrast to the Common External Tariff (CET) 
of the EEC. So EFTA did not affect the Commonwealth Imperial 
Preference system.
Prime Minister Macmillan then prepared bid for EEC
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niemljersh i P early in 1960. It was realized that the 
Commonwealth was mainly a series of bilateral relationshipsi 
mostly economic in nature, between Britain and her former 
colonies. So, it should be possible to preserve such links or 
adjust them to EEC membership. Moreover, the losses that 
would result from damaged Commonwealth relations could be 
compensated for by the gains in EEC membership through 
greater economic growth or more liberal trading policies 
within a larger market of Europe.
Consequently, in 1961 Prime Minister Edward Heath made
it clear that Britain was ready to accept a CET and join the
EEC, thus discriminating against imports from the
Commonwealth. Several ministers were sent to visit
Commonwealth countries in order to sound out their
objections to British EEC membership. However, the feed
back from the Commonwealth did not seem to have greatly
influenced the British decision to apply for EEC
17
membership.
As the British government realized the limitations of 
British economic, military and political power in the 
1960’s, British membership of the EEC was emphasized. "Only 
by strengthening her own economy through Common Market 
membership could Britain hope in the long run to retain 
influence in the Commonwealth. Politically, as well, the 
Commonwealth offered few opportunities for Britain to enhance 
her international position vis-à-vis the United States and
68
the Soviet Union”.
In the 1970’s the Commonwealth played a far less
19
important role as a restraining factor on the British side. 
And the objections of the Commonwealth countries to British 
membership of the EEC decreased. The reasons for this change 
of attitude are both economic and political. First, the 
change in Commonwealth industries and their pattern of trade 
increased their trade with non-Commonwealth countries,
including the EEC states, thus lessening their dependence on 
British markets. Secondly, the expectation was that a 
stronger Britain inside the EEC could play a considerable 
role in world affairs, thus promoting also Commonwealth 
interests. In addition to this, the mistrust and
disagreements between Britain and newer Commonwealth
countries facilitated British disengagement from the
20
Commonwealth priority.
For British European policy the Commonwealth was 
mainly a material concern which has been easily compensated 
for as Britain joined the EEC and was integrated into Europe. 
Gradually the Commonwealth concerns and constraints on
j)olicy-making declined to negligible levels as British 
])ragmatism found practical solutions to Commonwealth
problems.
18
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IV. EUROPEAN POLICIES AND BRITAIN
1) The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
The Common Agricultural Policy is the main common
economic policy of t)ie European Community. It absorbs about
1
three-quarters of EC expenditure, nearly half of which
goes to dairy products. Initially the CAP was designed to 
ensure that adequate supplies of foodstuffs were always 
available at a price which sustains good living standards 
for farmers inside the EC.
Under the CAP a target price is set annually for each
product sold on the open market. And the prices are
controlled by "a mixture of minimum import prices supported
by import taxes, and intervention prices supported by
2
intervention buying and export subsidies." The prices which 
are set in units of account are translated into each national 
currency at rates of exchange called "green rates", and are 
fixed by the Council of Ministers.
However, the CAP has two major disadvantages. First, 
the farm product prices under the CAP are generally higher 
than those on the world markets thus consumers in the EC 
have to pay more for such products. Secondly, the guaranteed 
price encourages farmers to produce amounts that exceed 
tJie domestic consumption and this results in agricultural 
surplus all over the community, which burdens the EC budget.
When Britain opted for membership of the EC the CAP
7]
presented itself as the most difficult adjustment problem for
the British economy. This and the question of the British
budgetary contribution to the Community has become known as
3
’’the British Problem”.
The structure of the British economy is very different 
from its European counterparts, who have a higher proportion 
of population involved in agriculture and are almost self- 
sufficient. In contrast, Britain is a highly urbanized
industrial society with a small, albeit efficient, 
agricultural sector, and is a substantial importer of 
foodstuffs.
Due to the country’s history of early industrialization
the British agricultural sector is relatively small in
comparison to that of the Six. The share of farming in the
GDP in Britain in 1979 was only 2,3% and the proportion of
4
the labour force involved in farming was 2,6% . Hence
Britain is an importer of farm products. Until the EC
membership the Commonwealth preference system provided
Britain with cheap food and British farmers were protected
through the policy of deficiency payments, i.e. a policy of
direct income subsidization.
As a late entrant to the European Community Britain was
faced with the problem of adapting to a policy over the
development of whicfi it had had no influence. But the
reactionary attitude of the British, regarded as a negative,
5
”non-communautaire” member, is merely the pursuit of
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national interest, and is a natural right of a member state, 
as practised by the French, the Germans and all other 
members.
T\ie Effects of CAP:
The CAP has had adverse effects on the British economy 
and on its contribution to the EC budget.
First of all, the CAP means that British farmers 
I'eceive higher prices for their products as a consequence EC 
1)гісе fixing and that the consumers have to pay higher prices 
due to the price rise at the production level. Secondly, in 
order to protect home producers the CAP close the British 
market to the Commonwealth and other foreign suppliers of 
cheap food, thus burdening the British government with the 
Ijigh cost of price support. Consequently, as Britain is a 
net importer of food, the CAP involves considerable cost to 
Britain’s balance of payments through its high budget 
contribution.
Before British membership various forecasts about these
(fffects were made. According to the Confederation of British
Industry (CBI), the annual net loss on the balance of
payments of pounds 300 million or about 1% of the national 
6
income , it proved to be the best prediction. According to
the White Paper of 1970 the rise in food prices after
adapting CAP was predicted as between 18 and 26%, but the
second White Paper of 1971 moderated this to 2,5% up to 16%
7
by 1978 , The outcome was in fact in line with the CBI
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estimates and the price rises were about 16%.
However, the full impact of the CAP on the British
economy was not felt until after 1978. The first factor was 
‘ ‘ 8
the ‘world food crisis* resulting in a sharp rise in world
wheat prices. This almost closed the gap between world
prices and the CAP prices. So during the 1975 referendum the
CAP appeared to be a secure supply of food rather than an
9
expensive price of membership.
Secondly, the green pound was kept at artificially low
levels so that the returns to British farmers were below
10
those of other EC states. Thus the green rates, which
are at the discretion of national governments because of the
need for unanimity in the Council of Ministers, became useful
policy instrument in the hands of the British government,
which used it to stabilize prices and to delay the
11
adjustments to new price levels.
The Balance of Payments Costs of CAP:
Under the CAP the prices of British farm products are
raised, but as Britain is a food importer, food imports
from other member states are also bought at higher prices.
And since the imports from third countries are taxed and the
levy revenue goes directly to the Community budget of own
resources, the British contribution to the Community budget
is among the highest although its receipts are low. This
12
results in a ‘balance of payments costs* for Britain.
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According to 1980 figures, Britain provides 20% of the 
13
Community budget , of which 19% is from agricultural 
14
levies. Yet British receipts from the Community budget
15
are only 8,7%. So, Britain receives much less than it pays
to the EC.
As a result, the British budgetary contribution has
become a major political issue. The Conservative government
under Mrs. Thatcher has been demanding a reduction in
British budgetary contributions and long-term changes in the
16
EC budget system and the CAP. In the 1980*s the British
position hardened and included the option of blocking the
development of Community policy in other areas if this issue
17
remained unresolved.
This British attitude of pursuing its vital national
interests has been the main source of the EC views that
Britain is a dissident, troublesome member. But it should
be remembered that the compilation of the CAP was a French
18
pre-condition for lifting the veto on British membership , 
as the CAP favoured mainly the agricultural French.
It is the natural reaction of the British government to 
he preoccupied with CAP and budgetary problems, because this 
is a significant burden on the declining British economy and 
an effective weapon in the hands of those opposing British 
membership of the EC. Moreover, the CAP and budgetary 
contribution problems are identified as problems facing the 
Conservative government. And the influence of British
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interest groups, particularly the NFU has remained limited
with respect to reforming the CAP while public opinion has
remained apathetic to the issue. The British government thus
finds itself facing a significant problem in which it is in
conflict with the interests of other EC states and has to
respond to opposition organized by the Labour party.
Even after 10 years of effort by the Conservative
government no long-term solution has been agreed upon,
except temporary relief payments, and the problems of CAP
and budget remain an issue of domestic politics and British -
19
EC controversy. But the British ’’minimalism” is a 
superficial issue which could be reversed as soon as a 
pragmatic solution is found to the problems.
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- ) tLUmii'Afi -PQ-LI t I Coopérât ion ( EPC )
European Political Cooperation, agreed upon in the
Luxembourg report of 1970, aimed at coordinating the foreign
policies of EC member states through consultations,
harmonization of views and, when necessary, joint actions.
In contrast to the CAP where Britain has been the
dissident member, in EPC Britain has been more enthusiastic
about efforts to coordinate the foreign policies of European 
1
states.
The prevailing view has been that ’^British interests
2
broadly coincided with the centre ground in EPC”. The main
underlying reason has been the realization that Britain could
be more influential by acting within the EC framework rather
than alone and that the special relationships with the
Commonwealth and the USA do not count any more as
alternatives to EC. As the former British Prime Ministr
Edward Heath rightfully states: ”0ur place is in Europe.
Our policy must be European. We are friends and allies of
the United States as Europeans, and that’s basic. But we
must no longer try to ride both horses at the same time, for
as we will increasingly see, we have no influence
economically, militarily or politically on the United
States, Those are realities. We must face them and make a
3
success of the power we can use, which is that of Europe” .
In 1981 the British government sought to play a pro­
active role in taking EPC further by strengthening the
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procedures througli the London Report. Thus EPC has been 
the area where Britain has become more "European" ili i'. ■ 
orientation. In EPC the benefits lie in common bargaining
strength and in the influence gained by concerting diplomatic
5
efforts. However, the displacement of national objectives 
by EC ones have not been materialized.
In fact, Britain has used EPC mainly as a means of 
safeguarding its international position and its remaining
power and also as a significant channel for its diplomatic
6
actions. Like France, Britain retained some of its 
overseas security commitments and is therefore, sometimes 
involved in overseas military conflicts. Consequently, EPC
has provided a cover and support for out-of-area concerns as
7
in the case of Falklands.
During the Falklands crisis of 1982, when Argentina
invaded the islands, there was unanimous agreement among EC
countries, that the invasion be condemned and a ban put on
8
Argentine exports to the Community. However, when Britain 
used military means, the Ten fell apart. Even so, the 
majority of the EC backed the sanctions until the end of the 
crisis.
Britain maintains its vital national interests in the 
world as "domaines réservés", like France does, and is only 
prepared to consult its European partners on these if their 
support can be useful or is necessary, as for economic 
sanctions or political declarations, to further its national
80
interests. For instance, in the case of South Africa,
where Britain has economic interests, the EC agreed on a
10
package of economic measures. This has enabled Britain to 
find a middle ground between her interests and the pressures 
of the Commonwealth.
Still, when its interests were in line Britain
preferred the 'Summit of the Seven’ of USA, Canada, leading
11
EC countries and Japan, in setting out global priorities.
Besides this, Britain is involved in coalition building
processes and more importance is given to the triangular
12
dialogue between Paris-Bonn-London.
As a stronger state in the EC, Britain sometimes treats
its EC partners just as the USA treats Europe. In the Libyan
affair of 1986 Britain let the USA use its air bases in
Britain for an attack on Libya, without consulting its EC
allies. The timing of the attack just when the EC had called
for restraint dismayed Britain’s EC partners over its grant
of permission to the USA without consulting or even informing 
13
other EC states.
This does not mean that Britain still relies entirely 
on the US special relationship, but rather that it 
aims at taking the lead in EPC and playing an influential 
role in world affairs. The importance of a strong, both 
economically and politically, Europe in which Britain is a 
leading member is significant for British governments. And 
there is still a gap between the economic weight of the
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Twc^lfe ¿irid U i o i r  p o l i t i c a l  influ(?nce in the world as a 
14
group. Therefore Britain aims at promoting its national
interests by strengthening Europe in world affairs.
The increasing activity and Europeanness of the British
is illustrated in the sharp change during the third
15
presidency of Britain in the EC in 1986. "The British
policy has shifted to a remarkable degree towards recognition
that the best change of influence lies in closer European 
16
collaboration."
But Britain’s national interests remain a reality, and 
the EPC provides a more influential means of promoting them.
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V. CONCLUSION
The study on the British European policy is in line with 
the assumption that nation states are the main actors in the 
EC· and their interests are the main locus of their actions. 
Britain, like other member states pursues its own national 
interests and EC provides it with new means to promote these 
vital interest.
The analysis on the British European policy has mainly 
reflected the pecularities of the British political culture 
and the domestic political factors.
The structure of the government, its domestic economic and 
political concerns and the policies of successive governments 
have been the main determinants of European policy.
Likewise, for the political parties, their struggle for 
power, their internal quarrels and their general economic and 
political outlook shape their European policies, which tends 
to shift easily according to the relevant domestic 
circumstances. Despite tlieir differences, the major political 
parties, that is the Labour and the Conzerative, share the 
common belief in the 1990*s that Britain should remain in the 
EC.
Among the Br-itish interest groups, the Trade Union 
Coijgress, tlie British Bankers Association, the Confederation 
of British Industries and the National Farmers Union are 
significant within Europe by their membership in European 
level organizations. However, they can mainly be effective 
through their links with the political parties and the
85
government.
The British public opinion is volatile and is in general 
apathy to the European issues. But party identification, age, 
region and class are relevant factors in determining the 
level of support for EC. Moreover, political and mainly 
economic expectations of the people play an important role. 
Still, the pul)lic opinion is open to the influence by the 
political parties and it remains irrelevant to the European 
issues unless it is mobilized by the parties or the 
government.
Among the special relationships in foreign policy, the 
Araerican-British relations have been the first priority after 
the post-war era, but has relatively less influence in the 
1990*s. However, together with the Atlantic partnership, the 
relations with USA is an on-going political and psychological 
concern, which comes forth from time to time.
The relationship with the Commonwealth, which has been 
mainly composed of preferrential trade in agriculture, has 
lost its influence on the British European policy as 
integration in to Europe compensated for this pragmatic 
concern. Consequently, Europe is the real focus of attention 
where Britain aims at promoting its vital interests most 
siiccesful ly.
Illustrative of the British policy towards Europe was the 
two areas of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and European 
Political Cooperation (EPC). The CAP presented Britain with
86
the most difficult adjustment problem and the balance of 
payments costs, which formed the basis for the identification 
of Britain as a reluctant member. However, the pursuit of 
vital economic interests, having also political repercussions 
is a natural right of each member state in the EC.
Furthermore, in the EPC Britain has been a more active and 
enthusiastic member because its major interests were in line 
with the general attitude in EC and also because Britain 
could benefit from the collective diplomacy of a strengthened 
Eli rope.
Hence, the analysis confirms the view that national 
interest of EC member states have been transfered into the EC 
area. And the nation states as the main actors, aim at 
promoting their basic interests through the means provided by 
European integration.
Consequently, the domestic political factors are very 
influential in shaping the European policies. In the British 
case the main determinants are the policies of the political 
parties and the government. The interest groups are limited 
in their efforts to influence EC directly but rather aim at 
the British governmental channels. Less significant is the 
public opinion, which is inactive unless mobilized by the 
other factors.
However, in 1990*s all these domestic factors converge on 
a common assumption that, if Britain can not succeed within 
the European Community, it is hard to think it can succeed
87
outside EC.
Consequently, as the influential domestic factors are now 
working in favour of EC membership, Britain will remain in 
the EC and British interests are in a strong and influential 
Europe.
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